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BOOK REVIEWS
THE HISTORIANS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW. By W. S. Holdsworth. Columbia
University Press, New York, 1928. PP. 175.
This book comprises a series of lectures delivered by W. S. Holdsworth
at Columbia University on the James I. Carpentier Foundation.
Professor Holdsworth is of the opinion that legal history should be writ-
ten either by lawyers who are historians, or by historians who are lawyers.
The professional tradition of the historical development of English law, he
thinks, became established in the last of the sixteenth and the early seven-
teenth centuries. Prior to this time he finds that practitioners used legal his-
tory only in the form of traditional legends, and then more to prove political
theses and to embellish arguments than to establish legal propositions. Even
Coke was not a true historian, for, though he made use of the Year Books,
he accepted Anglo-Saxon legends and was a fanatical politician. Yet the sys-
tem of case law was laying the foundation in the fourteenth century for this
tradition; and it soon became established, because of the necessity of adapting
mediaeval law to modern conditions, because the settlement of the power and
jurisdiction of the courts and of the prerogatives of the King involved history,
and because history was beginning to be studied for its own sake.
The pioneers in this field were Lombard and Somner, who showed up
the absurdities of the Anglo-Saxon fables and made the texts available; Dug-
dale, Prynne and Madox, who wrote the history of various legal institu-
tions; and Henry Spelman, who (with Madox and Somner) wrote the his-
tory of many legal doctrines. These were succeeded in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries by Selden, who was the first scientific historian of English
law; Hale, the greatest English historian before Maitland; Blackstone, the
only historian of English law as a whole up to his time; Reeves, who wrote
the first complete though dull history of English law to the reign of Eliza-
beth; and in the last half of the nineteenth century by Maine, a great student
of comparative law; Vinogradoff, with a profound knowledge of Roman law;
Dicey, who in the nineteenth century held a place comparable with Blackstone
in the eighteenth century; Pollock, the most learned English lawyer; and
finally Maitland, whom Professor Holdsworth regards as the greatest of all
English historians.
Professor Holdsworth believes that all true history is a history of ideas,
that there can be no effective legal history without comparisons, and that
it must be imbued with the spirit of historical criticism; and he believes that
all of the lawyer historians of the seventeei-th, eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, with the exception of Reeves, ranked high in all these respects. There
probably will be general agreement with Professor Holdsworth's estimates.
Lord Mansfield thought his age so much more enlightened than prior
ages, which he called "Gothic," that he paid very little attention to the pro-
fessional tradition, and Bentham thought the study of history of minor im-
portance; but Professor Holdsworth thinks that the professional tradition
was rightly successful in resisting Lord Mansfield's reform innovations and
in compelling Bentham's reforms to be carried out by men bred up in this
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tradition. One cannot but wonder if Professor Holdsworth has not here
overemphasized either the success or the advantages of the professional tra-
dition.
Professor Holdsworth is particularly generous in his recognition of the
value of the contributions to Anglo-American history by United States law-
yers. He names a great many as entitled to credit; but those given the most
credit are Holmes, Bigelow, Ames, Thayer, Gray, Langdell, Wigmore and
Street, at the head of which list he puts Holmes. The reviewer would not
quarrel with this judgment. Professor Holdsworth thinks the work of Amer-
icans has been scholarly, practical and liberal, It is flattering to get this
opinion from a man of Professor Holdsworth's standing. He also acknowl-
edges for Anglo-American history a debt to foreign contributors like Brunner
and Liebermann.
Professor Holdsworth himself exhibits in this book everything he has
said about the charm of style of Maitland, Pollock and Blackstone, and the
ability of Selden, Hale and Maitland to stand the test of modern scholarship.
Hugh E. Willis.
School of Law, Indiana University.
RATIONAL. oF PRoXI ATE CAUSE. By Leon Green. Vernon Law Book Com-
pany, Kansas City, 1927. Pp. viii, 2i3.
Always there has been genuine need of a book that would accurately anal-
yze, interpret and evaluate decisions of various types, resting upon, or pur-
porting to rest upon, one or another of the supposed rules growing out of the
several doctrines of causation. Leading thinkers and others have occasionally
attacked various phrases of the subject in articles in law journals, Hereto-
fore most of such literature has been written with too much reverence for the
great mass of judicial rubbish that has accumulated around the law of cause.
Eved the best articles on causation have lacked completeness in the working
out of a system really covering the field. With the most completp under-
standing of the judicial process and with approval only for the truth, Professor
Green has proceeded, in this great work, to interpret the decisions said to bear
upon this important subject. Not the least service done by the author is the
banishing of a host of cases from the realm of proximate cause. It is clearly
shown that many of the cases assumed by judges to be cases of causation are
really cases in which the question is, "Is the plaintiff's interest protected by
law, i. e., does the plaintiff have a right?" ori "Is the plainiff's interest pro-
tected against the particular hazard encountered , or, "Did the defendant's con-
duct violate the rule that protects the plaintiff's interest?"
The distinction between the question Whether- negligence exists and the
question whether a negligent act is the proximate cause is clearly shown.
Much light is cast upon the troublesome question of the functions of court
and jury in cases involving these questions.
Having disposed of preliminaries in a masterly fashion in the first four
chapters, the author proceeds, in chapter five, to discuss "the problem of causal
relation." This he does in the most careful and analytical manner. The text
bearing directly upon the causal relation constitutes an accurate statement of
148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the usual situation, in which the causal relation is a question of fact, and of
the less usual situation, in which facts as to the causal relation are so clear
as to raise no issue of fact. He elucidates the common type of case in which
the court mistakenly requires the jury to pass upon a legal question under
guise of determining proximate cause. The old notion that one rule of causa-
tion governs negligence cases and another rule governs intentional wrongs, is
well analyzed and corrected. The author demonstrates the error and empti-
ness of the probable consequence theory, and states the merits of the sub-
stantial factor theory, while recognizing the inexactness of this latter theory,
and its uncertainty in getting proper results from a jury.
The work is of value to law schools, law offices, and courts. The aca-
demic value of so scholarly a work in this important field is self-evident.
And it seems certain that it will be an invaluable aid, at least occasionally, in
the trial of negligence cases, especially during the period of stabilization of
the law of negligence and causation, which must follow the uncertainty and
instability of the supposed legal rules resulting from the orgy of loose and
untrained reasoning of courts in these fields during the past century. Although
the work is not large in volume, it seems to be one of the great law books
of this generation.
Ralph Stanley Bauer.
De Paul University Law School, Chicago.
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE. By Sherman Steele. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York,
1927. Pp. xi, 897.
This work, consisting of about three hundred cases, is "an attempt .
to present a fairly comprehensive survey of the doctrines of Equity Juris-
prudence as they are applied today in the American courts." It purports to
present all the heads of equity jurisdiction usually comprised within the sub-
jects designated as Equity in a typical law school curriculum, each chapter
and sub-division being introduced by a very compact statement of "principles"
in text or commentary form. Of the latter feature, the author says modestly,
that it "scarcely merits the designation of a summary, and, of course, does
not pretend to be an exposition of the subject. At best, it may serve to cor-
relate the cases and perhaps to put the student in a questioning frame of
mind . . . ." Considered from this point of view, the value of these sum-
maries may be questioned. Some of them are very well written, indeed, and
cover the topics to which they relate so comprehensively, though briefly, as to
leave little to the curiosity of the student. This is the case, for example, with
the historical introduction in Chapter I, with the article on trespass in subdivi-
sion 2 of Chapter IV and with that on prevention of multiplicity of suits, in
Chapter VIII. Some of the other summaries, however, entirely merit the
description given by the author. In short, the reviewer's impression is that a
slight lack of uniformity of treatment is manifest in the textual matter.
The collection of cases is remarkable. Many excellent modern American
decisions, which do not appear in any other compilation, have been found, and
the best of those which have been favorites of other editors have been re-
tained. Considering the scope and plan of the work, it is not too much to
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say that it would be difficult, indeed, to collate more strikingly teachable
groups of cases than are found repeatedly in many of the chapters.
Of course, one can always find ground, if not cause, for criticism; and
the ambitious project of reducing the case-material for the study of a sub-
ject, to which three standard law school courses are usually allotted, to the
dimensions of this one volume, could scarcely have been undertaken without
peril of pitfalls here and there. There is always the problem of arrange-
ment, which, perhaps, no two minds would solve alike. Yet it is difficult to
see the reason for postponing Massie v. Watts,' Silver Camp Mining Co. v.
Dickert, and other like cases for special treatment under specific perform-
ance, instead of selecting a smaller number of them to follow Gardner v.
Ogden,, (the first case in the book) and to illustrate more fully the important
point respecting action in personam. One would also think that, in such a
collection, the Salton Sea Cases,' or some representative of their class, would
be put into the first group, instead of Payne v. Hook,' which principally illus-
trates a point in federal jurisdiction. Somehow, it seems as if Chapter VI,
on restraint of actions at law, etc., should find place earlier in the book. The
complete segregation of the cases on prevention of multiplicity of suits, and
the introduction of this chapter immediately before specific performance is
encourltered, does not seem wholly satisfactory. The chapter on fulfillment of
conditions is made to include the cases on certainty and fairness, which ap-
pears to be illogical, and those on mutuality, which, though unusual, is stimu-
lating and suggestive. It excludes the cases on relief against forfeitures,
which are put in a separate chapter; and this is to be commended, although
it would seem more appropriate to place the two chapters in immediate suc-
cession. Similarly, the chapter on negative decrees might well have been
introduced earlier, instead of at the end of the subject of specific perform-
ance. No doubt, however, there is much to be said for the order of arrange-
ment employed.
Another matter involving discrimination is the relative quantities of ma-
terial to be used for the development of the several principles within the scope
of a work like this. In general, this book seems to be properly weighted in
this respect. As in more than one of the recent casebooks, the number of
cases on protection of business seems to the reviewer to be excessive, in pro-
portion to, the size of the work as a whole, especially as most of the opinions
discuss the substantive law of torts, rather than equitable problems as such.
There are no cases on mistake and misrepresentation as defenses to specific
performance, none on equitable restrictions on the use of property, and the
two on interpleader are of questionable value. More than fifty pages are given
over to a chapter on restraining official actions. To be sure, the quantity of
such litigation is great; but in view of the attention usually given to this
topic in other courses, this amount of space seems too great in a volume of
this total size.
16 Cranch 148 (U. S. 181o).
231 Mont. 488, 78 Pac. 967 (904).
32 N. Y. 327 (i86o).
A172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, i9og).
'7 Wall. 425 (U. S. 1868).
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On the other hand, the chapter on priorities and notice, and that on equitable
conversion, in both of which material is introduced which is not customarily
found in case books on Equity, represent valuable contributions and contain much
excellent material; though here, too, there is some overlapping of the field of
mortgages.
On the whole the author has achieved a real feat in the comprehensive-
ness of the view of contemporary Equity which he offers through the lim-
ited number of cases in this really excellent book.
Clarence D. Laylin.
College of Law, Ohio State University.
LES GOUVERNEMENTS DE FAIT DEVANT LE JUGE. By NoFl-Henry. Librairie R.
Guillon, Paris, 1927. Pp. xxxii, 26o.
Professor Basdevant in his preface to this book claims for it a perma-
nent place in legal literature. He is an interested judge, having watched pa-
ternally over its preparation. But his estimate is scarcely exaggerated; the
work is an event well worth the attention of all those concerned in the dif-
ficult questions arising out of the recognition or non-recognition of new gov-
ernments.
M. No-l-Henry's division of the subject into three parts, according as
the act of the de facto government is being considered (a) by the judge of
the State where it has held power, (b) by a foreign judge, or (c) by an in-
ternational tribunal, forms the basis for illuminating and weighty distinctions.
Part I will probably meet with little objections. Parts II and III, on the other
hand, are calculated to arouse keen criticism. But whether or not we agree
with the findings, we cannot but admire the scope and industry of the author's
research and the extraordinary clearness with which he conducts an elab-
orately documented argument.
When the foreign judge is asked to decide whether the act of a body
claiming to be the government of a State is or is not a valid act of that State,
his answer must depend absolutely, so we are told, upon whether or not such
body has been recognised by his own government. Recognitions expressed
to be de facto are here of precisely the same value and significance as those
de jure. The author is particularly interested at this point, as throughout his
book, in British and American precedents, and does not hesitate to attack what
he calls the recent shift in the course of American judicial decision. In a
very penetrating analysis of the cases involving the competence of the So-
viet Government, he attributes the shift to three things-(a) the erroneous
application of Civil War precedents, (b) the influence of Professor E. D.
Dickinson, and (c) the fear of contrary decision in countries which have rec-
ognised the present Russian regime.
The principle upon which M. No~l-Henry bases his strict limitation of the
judge's competence in these matters is the separation of powers. External
relations are the business of the executive government, not of the judiciary, and
for the latter to admit that a non-recognised government exercises for any
purpose the sovereignty of a foreign State would be an encroachment upon the
former's province. But this subordination of the judicial to the political au-
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thorities is surely carried too far when the judge is denied competence even
to decide whether any given relations amount to recognition. Here the usual
clarity of the argument breaks down, and some inconsistencies appear. Thus
we are told that the judge may act upon common knowledge of the status
of a government, which may well involve an appreciation of facts other than
express recognition. Again, the author cites with approval British decisions
based on an interpretation of certain Orders as equivalent to recognition de
facto. The insistence upon express recognition is clearly untenable.
In Part III, the most controversial thing is the assertion of a duty to,
recognize effective governments. There is no attempt to prove a rule of in-
ternational law to this effect, beyond a reference to the obligatory respect
for the sovereignty of the State in the choice of its rulers. The assertion
does not correspond to actual practice, and though the establishment of such
a duty may be desirable, it is scarcely more so than a duty to recognise States,
which duty M. No~l-Henry denies. If we reject this postulate, a good deal
of what is said about the grounds for decision in an international court goes
by the board, for, in the author's opinion, much depends upon whether a rec-
ognition has been illegally granted or refused. Some curious consequences
are deduced from failure in the alleged duty to recognise. Thus Government
A, which has succeeded in displacing Government B, may disown liability
for the latter's delicts against the subjects of a foreign State on the ground
that the foreign State had unjustly refused to recognise Government B. The
refusal was an affront to the State which Government B had in fact effectively
represented, and which Government A, perhaps assisted in its struggle for power
by the very refusal, now represents. The author here shows an inclination
for "strong decisions," an inclination which manifests itself again when he
allows a successful revolutionary government to repudiate obligations as-
sumed by it before recognition of its belligerency. In the latter case there
has also been an affront to the State, the affront being commerce with a body
which, though now recognised as the government of the country, was at the
time in revolt against the constituted authorities. We can scarcely follow M.
NoEl-Henry in this extension of the practice of allowing a defendant to take
refuge in his own iniquity.
Incidentally to the main thesis, a number of connected problems are dis-
cussed. Much real service is done in the dissipation of common illusions
about the extent to which international law is applied by national courts, the
significance, conditions and consequences of recognition of belligerency, the
utility of a status of insurgency and the retroactivity of recognition. But
the author has ignored or dismissed too summarily several unsettled ques-
tions more or less closely related to his theme. Thus, in connection with the
processual immunity of States, he has nothing to say of the widely admitted
exception as to real property, he is dogmatic regarding the effect of war on
treaties, and he casually observes that a State may be liable for a judicial
decision contrary to international law-matters, all of them, in which the
writer must still proceed with caution.
In spite of some differences of opinion, I would close this review with
repeated tribute to the scholarly author of an excellent monograph.
P. E. Corbett.
Faculty of Law, McGill Universty.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED To FOREIGN STATES. By Julius I. Puente.
Burdette J. Smith & Company, Chicago, 1928. Pp. xxiii, 299, Index.
In this analysis of the present state of International Law in American
jurisprudence, Mr. Puente, who, largely because of his former book on The
Foreign Consul, has already taken his place as an authority, adds a very useful
handbook to the bibliography of International Law, a subject which is fast
growing in importance.
Professor Hudson, of Harvard University, in addressing the Bar Asso-
ciation of New York City, calls attention to the astonishing advance in the
development of Internaitonal Law. In view of this development, Mr. Puente's
book is very timely and furnishes valuable source material of great assist-
ance in diplomatic, consular, and legal circles, upon the subjects of which
it treats.
In his introduction to the book, Mr. Puente states that he has attempted
to deal with the questions above-noted, with the "minute distinctions" which legal
precision requires, and describes his text as a case-text, or, an analysis of the
juridical status of foreign states in American jurisprudence. "Minute distinc-
tions" are not everywhere apparent in the book, as, for instance, when Mr.
Puente treats of search and seizure on the high seas of vessels of foreign regis-
try, and refers only to two cases and not to treaties made concerning that ques-
tion, and attempts to cover the whole subject in nine lines in his book.
On the other hand, to devote any space to the law governing the "Master
of the Horse" of a foreign minister, and to indicate this subject in large type,
when the only case' in which any question regarding the "Master of the
Horse" arose, dates back to the William Blackstone reports, would indicate a
lack of balance between those subjects requiring minute treatment and those
to which no treatment at all would, perhaps, not derogate from the value of
the book.
But the book contains valuable annotations, and, while essentially a sum-
mary of the law, is an excellent digest of many clarifying cases in American
and British Courts. It is a commentary on these cases rather than an essay
on the law, but it is also a logical presentation of numerous decisions, par-
ticularly American decisions, and, because of this, will take its place as a val-
uable source in which to find authoritative rulings on the subjects of which
it treats.
No recent book of its size and character presents in such a favorable form
citations of American cases which otherwise would be difficult to secure, and
the legal practitioner in America will find the book of inestimable service to
him in securing authority on the subjects treated, and such a practitioner will
rejoice that instead of indulging in speculation, the writer, as he states, con-
scientiously avoided it, and instead has studied the cases and cited them in
every instance for the principles which he asserts.
There will be no person engaged in any diplomatic service or having to
do with any Embassy, or Consulate, who can afford to be without this book.
1Poitier v. Croza, I Black. W. 48 (1749).
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Workmen's Compensation Acts and Federal Employer's Liability Acts, as
affected by treaties, and the recent decisions covering these points, by their
inclusion and treatment in the book, sufficiently indicate the careful work of
the author; and his citation of the most recent cases on phases of Interna-
tional Law commends the book to anyone who is sufficiently familiar with the
general subject, to realize what care and research have gone to its prepara-
tion.
On the whole, the book is not a reprint of other material, but a valuable
and new summary of the law and of the cases cited. The index of subjects
is excellent, but no index of cases cited is furnished. The index of "Words
and Phrases" is particularly to be commended.
William J. Conlen.
Philadelphia.
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